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Putin’s neo-tsarist, authoritarian system.
In addition, the Ministry of Defense,
rather than embracing a professional
army, insists upon expanding conscrip-
tion and enserfing thousands of men as
their ancestors were enserfed over a
century ago. Thus, until and unless de-
fense reforms are carried out beyond
mere reorganizations of the force struc-
ture, Russia cannot have effective
armed forces, security, or democracy.
Until then it will remain tempted by
imperialism and military adventurism,
as in Chechnya, and fail to retrieve its
European vocation or achieve true inte-
gration into Europe. Under the circum-
stances, then, it would be a good idea if
the authors could be prevailed upon to
write a second edition that incorporates
the most recent trends. Then we could
derive maximum benefit from this splen-
did book that was published too soon.
STEPHEN BLANK
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Penna.
Mallmann Showell, Jak P. German Naval Code-
breakers. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2003. 160pp. $29.95
In the almost thirty years since the pub-
lic revelation that the Allies in World
War II broke substantial portions of the
German ENIGMA cipher system, Allied
codebreaking has become a staple of
our understanding of the Battle of the
Atlantic. Less understood are the paral-
lel efforts of the German navy to break
Allied naval codes. The historical rec-
ord of German codebreaking is com-
paratively fragmentary, many records
having been destroyed during or imme-
diately after the war. German naval
intelligence was smaller than its Allied
counterparts and left a smaller trace.
Still, the influence of these German ef-
forts on the pivotal convoy battles of
the war has remained an important un-
answered question. In German Naval
Codebreakers, Jak Showell, author of
more than a dozen books on German
U-boats, has attempted to provide an
account of signals intelligence in the
German navy in World War II.
The German Naval Radio Monitoring
Service (or Funkbeobachtungsdienst,
commonly abbreviated B-Dienst)
worked with some success against Brit-
ish and American naval codes. During
the early period of the war until 1943,
the B-Dienst could read large parts of
the Allied merchant ship and convoy
codes, which provided important in-
sights into convoy operations and rout-
ing. In addition to codebreaking,
B-Dienst operated a network of direc-
tion finders that fixed the approximate
locations of radio transmissions in the
Atlantic.
Whatever its success at codebreaking,
the German navy in World War II
failed at the critical second step of intel-
ligence analysis. Showell creates the im-
pression that B-Dienst personnel were
separated from key operational com-
manders and were not permitted access
to information about their own forces’
operations. The B-Dienst was therefore
reduced to passing raw messages to se-
nior commands, feeding the complaint
that radio intelligence served only to
provide a flood of useless information.
This arrangement stands in marked
contrast to the intimate relationship be-
tween commanders and operational in-
telligence centers in Britain and the
United States.
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From the outset, the book suffers from
an unfortunate organization. At-
tempting to avoid a chronological his-
tory of the war at sea, the author has
arranged his material in a series of short
vignettes, separated by ship type and
area of operations. Lost in this organi-
zation is the common thread of the
B-Dienst itself. Showell, for example,
touches on the question of how intelli-
gence support was provided to German
units at sea in several sections but never
ties them together to address the critical
question of information dissemination
across the German navy. Showell at-
tempts to circumvent this problem by a
series of appendixes on organization,
but these are too brief to serve the need,
and the result is confusing and unclear.
Within these sections there are histori-
cal gems. For example, the author dis-
cusses a February 1943 incident in
which the B-Dienst intercepted a Brit-
ish message containing German subma-
rine locations—potential evidence that
the German code was itself being read
by the Allies. Ultimately, the German
navy convinced itself that its opera-
tional information had been compro-
mised through other means and that its
codes were secure. However, this gem,
like all others mentioned, suffers from
the second major failing of the book—
an almost complete lack of documenta-
tion. While the work contains a list of
recommended reading and mentions at
the outset that it is largely based on
work found in private archives in Ger-
many, there is no further reference to
the evidence.
The third and perhaps most important
failing of the book is a failure to explore
the full implications of German suc-
cesses and failures. The fundamental
historical question is how the German
navy set out to provide intelligence in-
formation to its commanders, and how
and why it succeeded or failed in that
effort. That question is never answered,
leaving the book at best titillating but
unsatisfying.
DALE C. RIELAGE
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Assistant Naval Attaché, Berlin
McCullough, David. 1776. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2005. 386pp. $32
David McCullough has written yet an-
other enormously enjoyable and infor-
mative narrative history. Compared to
his monumental Pulitzer Prize–winning
biographies of Harry Truman and John
Adams, 1776 is only a snapshot of a
crucial moment in time, although it is
every bit as engaging. It covers the
events of the seventeen months between
King George III’s October 1775 an-
nouncement to Parliament of unrelent-
ing war against his American colonies
and the arrival in Britain of the news of
George Washington’s victory at Tren-
ton in March 1777. A story of overcom-
ing adversity, 1776 focuses on the early
battles of the War of Independence,
which were mainly retreats for the rag-
ged and often exhausted Continental
Army.
Based on McCullough’s expert research
in American and British archives, the
story is packed with rich descriptions
drawn from both sources. At age forty-
four, Washington is at the moral cen-
ter of the drama. Although he had
never before led an army in battle and
is (as McCullough bluntly declares)
“indecisive and inept” in the early New
York campaigns, Washington learns
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